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Abstract:  
We focus in this paper on the effects of court errors on the optimal sharing of liability 
between firms and financiers, as an environmental policy instrument. Using a structural 
model of the interactions between firms, financial institutions, governments and courts 
we show, through numerical simulations, the distortions in liability sharing between firms 
and financiers that the imperfect implementation of government policies implies. We 
consider in particular the role played by the efficiency of the courts in avoiding Type I 
(finding an innocent firm guilty of inappropriate care) and Type II (finding a guilty firm 
innocent of inappropriate care) errors. This role is considered in a context where liability 
sharing is already distorted (when compared with first best values) due not only to the 
courts’ own imperfect assessment of safety care levels exerted by firm but also to the 
presence of moral hazard and adverse selection in financial contracting, as well as of non-
congruence of objectives between firms and financiers on the one hand and social welfare 
maximization on the other. Our results indicate that an increase in the efficiency of the 
court system in avoiding errors raises safety care levels, thereby reducing the probability 
of accident, and allowing the social welfare maximizing government to impose a lower 
liability [higher] share for firms [financiers] as well as a lower standard level of care.  
Keywords: Environmental Policy, Court Efficiency, Liability Sharing, Regulation, 
Incomplete Information.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The diffusion of industrial and environmental risks has stirred an important debate about 
the proper instruments to implement public policies toward environmental protection and 
industrial safety. Two such instruments are the distribution of responsibilities and 
liabilities, should an accident occur, among the different actors involved directly or 
indirectly in risky activities and the definition of proper plant-level care level and safety 
activities. 
Legislators typically impose a liability regime, either a strict one or a negligence-based 
one or both, and a wide range of plant-level regulations1 relative to environmental and/or 
industrial risks. The objective is to find the combination of liability rules and safety 
regulation and standards to be imposed on producers and operators as well as on other 
stakeholders in order to attain, though the level of care that the latter are incentivized to 
choose, the socially efficient level of environmental and industrial risks. Achieving the 
right balance of instruments is a highly complex task. 
Contributors to the debate have discussed theoretical properties of the joint use of the 
above two instruments, namely a liability regime, including the liability sharing formula, 
and a regulatory standard of care, in an asymmetric information framework given that the 
firms’ preventive care measures are often difficult to observe and verify.2  
From an economic perspective, a system of strict or negligence-based liability for 
industrial accidents together with a liability sharing rule among stakeholders can be seen 
as an instrument to internalise damage and to alleviate the judgement proof problem, 
which appears when the firm involved lacks the resources to pay for the damage it has 
caused. The assignment of liability, a generalization of both compulsory insurance and 
extended liability provisions under limited liability,3 provides potentially liable parties 
                                                 
1  For instance, Trebilcock and Winter (1997) discuss the case of accident in nuclear power production for 
which the Price–Anderson Act imposes strict liability in addition to a wide range of plant-level 
regulations by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
2  Shavell (1984); Kolstad, Ulen, Johnson (1990); Burrows (1999); Schmitz (2000); Innes (2004). 
3  The connection between ex post liability effects and ex ante prevention behaviour is stressed by the law 
and economics literature, for instance with respect to the jurisprudence surrounding the CERCLA. See 
Calabresi (1970); Shavell (1987), Boyer and Laffont (1997), Boyer and Porrini (2001, 2006). 
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with incentives to require, to induce and/or to exert proper care: an ex post liability 
system induces ex ante investments in care.  
We wish to illustrate in this paper the incomplete information efficient distortions (from 
the first-best values obtained under full, albeit imperfect information) in the liability 
sharing formula and the standard of care. We propose an extended principal-agent 
liability model to analyze the distribution of liability shares among firms and financiers 
(insurers or bankers). The law and economics literature represents principal-agent 
liability as a framework where rational self-interested agents choose their preventive care 
level under the monitoring activities of a principal.4 We widen the traditional framework 
by adopting the legislator’s point of view in determining the liability sharing rule 
between firms and financiers and the standard of care in order to maximize social 
welfare, taking into account the asymmetric information (moral hazard and adverse 
selection) present in financial contracting as well as the existence of court errors in 
finding a firm guilty or not of negligence. Hence, we consider the relationships between 
four actors or stakeholders in the determination of the probability of 
environmental/industrial accidents: firms, financiers, government and courts.5 An 
important specific contribution of this paper is to take a first look at the impact of court 
efficiency in avoiding judicial errors on the liability sharing formula and the standard of 
care.  
In the next section, we discuss the implementation of liability sharing among firms and 
financiers through financial responsibility, lenders’ liability provisions and jurisprudence 
in the American and European systems. In section 3, we discuss the effects of court errors 
in the context of achieving an efficient environmental policies choice of instruments. 
Section 4 is devoted to modelling the interactions between governments, firms, financiers 
and courts in the determination of the probability of accident, in a context characterized 
by moral hazard and adverse selection, an imperfect court system, and the non-
congruence of objectives between firms and financiers on the one hand and a social 
                                                 
4 See Polinsky (2003) for standard presentation and discussion of such frameworks. Daughety and 
Reinganum (2003) proposed to widen the standard law and economics framework by assuming, in 
reference to product liability, that the market conditions and the tort system interact to affect the decision 
on care levels. 
5  See also Boyer and Porrini (2008). 
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welfare maximizing benevolent government on the other. We present, in Section 5, a 
simplified example, which incorporates the main characteristics and constraints of the 
analytically (too) complex interactions between the four stakeholders. We perform, in 
Section 6, a sensitivity analysis of the impact on the liability sharing formula, on the 
standard level of care, and on the levels of the other endogenous variables (exerted care 
level, probability of accident, probability of suing, and probability of conviction) of 
variations in the efficiency of the court system and of other parameters of interest such as 
the profitability of the firm’s project or activities, the cost of care activities, the efficiency 
of care in reducing the probability of accident, the cost of suing, and the social cost of 
public funds. We conclude in Section 7. 
2. LIABILITY SHARING AMONG FIRMS AND FINANCIERS: US AND EU  
Civil liability for environmental damages has become a relevant instrument of 
environmental policy. In the US, the issue of environmental liability emerged some thirty 
years ago with several important pollution cases unravelling and, at the same time, an 
increased number of small enterprises entering risky sectors.6 Congress enacted the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) in 
1980 and a whole range of amendments in the following years, in order to cope with the 
“decontamination” of polluted sites by creating a Superfund for quick relief and remedy 
action once an accident has occurred and by recovering the clean-up and compensation 
costs from the liable parties.7  
The liable parties include by law the past owners and the operators of the affected sites, 
as well as the current owners and operators, the generators of dangerous polluting 
materials stored on those sites, and the carriers of such material. Hence, the system is 
characterised by the retroactivity of liabilities and the involvement of many liable parties, 
the so-called Potentially Responsible Parties.   
                                                 
6   See Ringleb and Wiggins (1990). 
7  CERCLA covers damages on the specified sites, resulting in particular from the contamination produced 
by dangerous activities, as well as damages to natural resources. The Superfund allows decontaminating 
the sites included in a national list, the National Priority List (NPL), with money being primarily 
collected from taxes on oil and oil-derived product 
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Regarding the European experience, the Directive on Environmental Liability with 
Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage8 states: “The 
prevention and remedying of environmental damage should be implemented through the 
furtherance of the ‘polluter pays' principle’, as indicated in the Treaty and in line with the 
principle of sustainable development. The fundamental principle of this Directive should 
therefore be that an operator whose activity has caused the environmental damage or the 
imminent threat of such damage is to be held financially liable, in order to induce 
operators to adopt measures and develop practices to minimise the risks of environmental 
damage so that their exposure to financial liabilities is reduced.”  
From a law and economics analysis viewpoint, these ex post systems of liability could 
provide firms with optimal incentives to undertake ex ante safety measures and, in this 
way, could induce firms to internalize the full costs associated with accidents.9 However, 
environmental damages are often very large and it is not uncommon that they exceed the 
resources of the responsible firm. The liability triggers the bankruptcy of the firm: the so 
called “judgement proof”10 problem, under which residual damages remain externalised 
and uncompensated, thereby reducing the ex ante incentives for care and therefore the 
exerted level of care falls below the optimal level. One way by which environmental laws 
aim to remedy such judgement proof problem is to extend liability for residual damages 
to parties that are somewhat related to the firm. 
In America, in spite of a secured interest exemption clause protecting financial 
institutions holding instruments of ownership on the firm’s assets, the courts have 
repeatedly considered secured lenders as owners or operators, insofar as their 
involvement in the firm exceeded the level warranted to secure their interest.11 
                                                 
8   Directive 2004/35/CE of the European parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on environmental 
liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, Official Journal of the 
European Union, L143/56, 30/4/04.  
9  See footnotes 2 and 3 above. 
10 See Shavell (1986).  
11 See for instance the following major court cases: United States vs. Mirabile (15, Environmental Law 
Reports 20, 994 (E.D. Pa 1985)); United States vs. Maryland Bank and Trust (632 F. Su 573 (d. Md. 
1986)); United States vs. Fleet Factors Corp. (901 F. 2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. Denied, 498 US 
1046 (1991)). The critical level of involvement was lowered over time and lender’s liability turned out to 
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In Europe, the article 14 of the Directive 2004/35/CE states: “Member States shall take 
measures to encourage the development of financial security instruments and markets by 
the appropriate economic and financial operators, including financial mechanisms in case 
of insolvency, with the aim of enabling operators to use financial guarantees to cover 
their responsibilities under this Directive”. 
Extending liability could, under certain conditions, be efficient given the possibility of the 
parties, through their contractual relationship, to restore the firm’s incentive to take the 
“optimal” level of care. Under full information, the full extension of ex post liability to a 
firm’s deep pocket financiers is efficient because the latter will induce the firms to adopt 
adequate prevention measures. The socially optimal level of prevention is then attained 
and victims are appropriately compensated if damage does occur. Reality, however, lags 
woefully behind such optimal conditions, as under asymmetric information, financiers 
have only incomplete information about the preventive measures adopted by the firms 
they finance. Thus, financial institutions cannot fully link the terms of the financial 
contract with the desired level of prevention. In such contexts, Boyer and Laffont (1997) 
show that partial extended liability may be necessary to obtain the second-best levels of 
financing and prevention.  
Lenders’ liability, insurance policies, and financial responsibility12 are instruments 
through which responsibility is extended and therefore shared between the firms and their 
financial partners. Clearly, financiers will transfer their expected extended liability cost to 
the firm through the financing conditions: extending liability has an effect on a firm’s 
prevention activities through the provisions surrounding the financing of the firm.  
                                                                                                                                                 
be more common than expected or intended; for an economic analysis of lenders’ liability cases, see 
Boyer and Laffont (1996), and Boyer and Porrini (2004). 
12 Financial responsibility may be proven by different means such as letters of credit and surety bonds; cash 
accounts and certificates of deposit; self-insurance and corporate guarantee. In the case of hazardous 
waste, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response Act (CERCLA) provide for the companies that "treat, store, dispose, or transport hazardous 
waste" to demonstrate adequate financial guarantees for third-party damage, through an insurance or a 
proof of financial coverage. See also the Oil Pollution Act (33 USC §2716), the Safe Drinking Water Act 
(SDWA), the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), and the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act (SMCRA). See Boyd (2001) for an assessment of the implementation of financial 
assurance in the US: “On the whole, cost recovery, deterrence, and enforcement are significantly 
improved by the presence of existing assurance regulations.” 
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Starting from the practical experience in the United States with CERCLA, any owner or 
operator of a facility involved in environmental damage may be held liable for clean-up 
costs and victims’ compensation: in some court decisions13 banks have been prosecuted 
in order to recover these costs, while others have been exempted, depending on their 
degree of implication in the activity of the firm, which made them, from the judges’ point 
of view, either “operators of the facility” or not. 
3. LIABILITY SHARING, COURT ERRORS, AND THE CHOICE OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES  
The economic analysis of the efficiency of lender’s liability and financial responsibility14 
leads in the direction of characterizing the proper sharing of liability between firms and 
financiers. To allow for such considerations in our model, we give financiers the right to 
be protected from negligent firms, even under the basic strict liability rule: the financier 
may decide to sue the firm for negligence (that is, for having exerted a level of care lower 
than standard level fixed by the government) and if it does, it will fall on the courts to 
decide on negligence. The important role of the courts in this context is to assess and 
verify whether the firm did abide by the government-determined standard of care or not. 
In this way, the financial institutions have the possibility to recover part of the payment 
they already expensed (under strict liability) for the environmental damage caused by 
negligent firms. 
But considering the role of the courts in judging the negligence of the firms, we come 
across the problem of the presence of judicial errors. That courts make errors is a fact, 
plainly accepted and studied by legal scholars. Regarding court errors, Tullock (1994) 
writes: “Even the best functioning legal system will not function without committing 
errors. Court errors can be about questions of law and questions of fact.” Indeed in the 
U.S., state supreme courts used to be called “Court of Errors” because one of their main 
functions is to correct egregious errors by lower courts. Significant resources are devoted 
to improve, both from legal and fact-finding viewpoints, the record of courts at all levels 
in avoiding errors of Type I (finding an innocent firm guilty of negligence) and of Type II 
                                                 
13 See above footnote 10. 
14 About lenders’ liability, see Pitchford (1995); about financial responsibility, see Fees and Hege (2000) 
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(finding innocent a negligent firm). Marco (2006) quantifies beliefs about patent validity 
and court errors in a Bayesian context and estimates that market beliefs about courts 
show that Type I errors (finding a valid patent invalid) are believed to occur very 
frequently (45%) while Type II errors (finding an invalid patent valid), to occur with near 
zero probability.  
In the law and economics literature, standard models of deterrence consider both types of 
errors and show that they are both detrimental to deterrence:15 acquittals of guilty 
individuals make crime more profitable as they lower the probability of conviction and 
thus dilute deterrence, while convictions of innocents make crime more convenient by 
lowering the relative benefits of staying honest.  
The theoretical consequences of court errors, particularly judicial errors and their 
reduction, i.e. the court system accuracy, have been analyzed in law and economics 
models on enforcement. As expressed by Kaplow (1994, p. 348): “Accuracy is relevant in 
controlling behavior because increasing accuracy, like increasing the level of sanctions or 
enforcement effort, is a method of increasing deterrence. The reasoning involves two 
components. First, greater accuracy- holding sanctions and enforcement effort constant- 
increases the likelihood that the guilty are sanctioned rather than mistakenly exonerated. 
Thus, individuals contemplating whether to act expect the likelihood of sanctions to be 
higher if they commit the harmful act. (The likelihood is the product of the probability 
that they will be detected and the probability that they will be sanctioned given detection. 
Increasing enforcement effort raises the first factor and increasing accuracy raises the 
second factor.) Second, greater accuracy reduces the likelihood that the truly innocent are 
sanctioned. This makes a decision not to commit the act look more attractive. Both 
factors -making harmful acts less attractive and harmless behavior more attractive- 
increase deterrence.”16 
                                                 
15 See Png (1987); Polinsky and Shavell (2007). 
16 See Boyer, Lewis and Liu (2000) for a two stage game theoretic analysis where the level of enforcement 
effort and the level of negligence are simultaneously determined (in stage 2) in reaction to the levels of 
sanction and due care (stage 1) optimally chosen in anticipation of the second stage game played by the 
legal enforcer and the care exerting party.  
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Polinsky and Shavell (2007), among others, focus on the (negative) impact or such errors 
on deterrence. In their framework, accuracy is always desirable but reducing errors 
requires more enforcement resources and so a cost benefit analysis is needed to find the 
optimality. Bhole (2007) and Bhole and Wagner (2008) discuss different ways to induce 
a given care level through due-care standards and penalty multipliers when courts can err 
in finding firms guilty or not of improper behaviour.  
Different results can be obtained depending on which liability framework is considered. 
For example, Bisso and Choi (2007), observing that a deep-pocket principal is often held 
liable and responsible for harm caused by a judgment-proof agent’s negligence (vicarious 
liability). They analyse in such a context the relationships between a principal and an 
agent when a court determines whether the agent was negligent of not with some level of 
error. They show that “reducing the error of declaring the agent not negligent even when 
he was (pro-defendant or type II error) is better than reducing the error of declaring the 
agent negligent even when he was not (pro-plaintiff or type I error).” Intuitively, there is 
a mean preserving spread between the two in such a way that the agent is more sensitive 
to a reduction of the former.17  
In our model, we consider a context where the courts impose liability on the injurer 
(agent) sued by a party (principal) that has some means to influence the injurer’s choice 
of actions. This is an extended and shared liability framework. As discussed above, such 
a framework is often justified on the grounds that the agent tends to have insufficient 
assets to pay for the harm caused (judgment proof), hence suboptimal incentive to take 
care when performing a potentially hazardous task. From the viewpoint of environmental 
policies, extending liability to a deep-pocket principal will generate a reduction in the 
probability of accident because the principal is then induced to exert effort to influence 
the agent’s chosen actions through better monitoring and a stronger incentive scheme for 
the agent. In our context, the law allows the principal to sue the agent if and when the 
latter causes an accident and is believed to have acted negligently. We consider the 
                                                 
17 See Rothchild and Stiglitz (1970) and Boyer and Dionne (1983) for discussions of mean preserving 
spreads. 
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interactions between the liability sharing factor and the efficiency of courts in avoiding 
judicial errors as determinants of the choice of environmental policies. 
4. THE MODEL  
The behaviours of the four actors, namely government, financiers, firms and courts, are 
subject to significant constraints: the limited liability of firms, the limited capacity of 
governments to intervene, the limited power of the court system to search and find all the 
facts relevant to a judgement, and the asymmetric information between the actors. The 
probability of an accident depends in a real sense on the actions of those four actors or 
stakeholders, interacting under information constraints, legal constraints, and bounded 
rationality constraints. It therefore results from the interactions between those actors, 
whose interests and objectives will not in general be congruent.18 We analyse those 
interactions as a three stage game to characterize subgame perfect equilibria.  
In stage 1, the government chooses the strict liability sharing rule α, by which the firm is 
strictly liable for α% of the cost of an accident while the financier is strictly liable for (1- 
α)% of that cost, and the standard level of care s to maximize a social welfare function 
we will characterize below.  
In stage 2, given the values of α and s chosen by the government, a firm and a bank enter 
into a financial contract. We assume that the firm needs a loan of K from the bank to 
operate a risky project: the project generates net benefits (profits) π1 with probability μ  
and π2 with probability μ−1 , with 12 ππ > . The realized level of profit is typically 
private information of the firm. The firm must repay the loan plus interest and failing to 
do so triggers bankruptcy procedures. In order to concentrate on the judgment proof 
problem, we assume that, in the no accident case, the firm always repays the bank and 
that, in the accident case, the bank has priority on other claimants on the firm resources. 
Hence, the loan is basically riskless.19  
                                                 
18 The model we develop here is based on Boyer and Porrini (2006, 2008) with an important change: the 
court assessment of liability in litigation cases. 
19 This is clearly a strong assumption which could be relaxed at the cost of more complexity. In the present 
case and for our purpose, this additional complexity would not bring significant additional insights. 
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The amount to be repaid by the firm to the financier depends neither on the firm’s exerted 
level of care nor on the firm’s profits, as those variable are unobservable; it is rather 
composed of two terms: (1 ) (1 ) ( )r K p s Lα+ + − , where r is the (exogenous) competitive 
riskless interest rate, and Lsp )()1( α−  is a ‘liability premium’, where ( )p ⋅  is the 
probability of accident and L is the level of damage if an accident occurs. This liability 
premium is based on the observed legal level of care s and not on the level of exerted care 
q.  
The firm and the financier choose their respective decision variables at this stage: we 
assume that the financier first announces and commits to its choice of probability of suing 
ν20 at cost C(ν), before the firm, observing ν, chooses a level of care activities q at cost 
Q(q), which determines the true probability p(q) of an accident [assumed to be decreasing 
and convex: 0)(' <qp , 0)('' >qp ]. We characterize the resulting Stackelberg 
Equilibrium in (ν, q).  
Two different types of liability are present in our model: first, a strict liability rule that 
governs the share of costs that falls respectively on the financiers and the firms; second, a 
liability for negligence under which the financial partner can sue the firm to recover its 
share of the costs of the accident if the firm is found by the court to have exerted a level 
of care below the standard level determined by the government. It is through this capacity 
to sue that financiers appear as limited and constrained principals and the firms as 
agents.21 
In stage 3, all actors observe whether an accident occurs or not (profits remain 
unobserved). If no accident occurs, the firm realizes the profits of the project and repays 
the bank. If an accident occurs, the strict liability rule applies: the financier is responsible 
                                                 
20 We assume that the financier commits to its choice of ν. One may think that if the financier builds up a 
suing capacity, for instance through a specific inside group of lawyers, then it is bound to let them work 
full time and therefore sue firms with the implied probability ν.  
21 See Shavell (1982) for the strict liability rule and Fagart and Fluet (2007) for the negligence rule. See 
also Demougin and Fluet (2008) for a discussion of the standard of proof in such a context. See also 
Boyer and Laffont (1996) and Boyer and Porrini (2004) for a discussion of the decision in the Fleet 
Factor case, in which the judge expands on the likelihood of financial partners to be better principals than 
government officials.    
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for covering (1-α)L and the firm for covering αL of the cost L of the accident. The 
financier sues the firm with probability ν.  
If the financier indeed sues the firm, then the latter incurs legal defence cost CF and the 
case is litigated in court. The court suffers from asymmetric information, as the 
government and the financier, but is assumed to have superior power to investigate the 
safety behaviour of the firm. The court ponders the evidence and decides on whether 
there is breach of contract, that is, whether q is less than s or not. We represent the court 
decision making process under incomplete information as follows: the firm is found 
guilty of insufficient care with a reduced-form probability ( , ) ( , , ) ( , )ˆ ,q s f q s P q sP γ=  
where the function ( , )P q s  is assumed to be always positive (hence, both Type I and 
Type II errors are possible), but decreasing and convex in q and increasing in s [namely 
( , ) 0,  ( , ) 0 and ( , ) 0q qq sP q s P q s P q s< > > ]. The parameter γ in the function 
( , , )f q s γ represents, as discussed below, the efficiency of the court in avoiding those 
errors: a larger γ will imply a lower probability of both Type I and Type II errors.  
If convicted of negligence, the firm makes the additional payment L)1( α−  if possible 
and otherwise goes bankrupt, in which case the financier seizes the firm’s net assets, 
equal in value to { }1max 0,  ( ) FL ZZ Q q Cπ α− − − − .  
The determination of endogenous variables or decisions (α, s, ν and q) is obtained 
recursively. 
The third stage: At this stage all variables have been determined, leading eventually to a 
resulting state of the world. Hence, given previously determined values of α, s, ν, and q, 
we obtain the expected values of the financier’s profit and the firm’s profit. 
The total expected profit of the financier IEΠ  can be written as follows, where 
LspKrZZ )()1()1( α−++= : 
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( )
{ }1
1 2 ( )
ˆ         ( ) (1 ) (1 ( , )) (1 )
ˆ                 ( ) ( , )(1 )[0]
ˆ                             ( ) ( , ) (1 ) max 0, ( )
, , , ; , , , ,
F
I ZZ C
p q P q s L
p q P q s
p q P q s L L ZZ Q q C
E q s K r ν
ν ν α
ν μ
ν μ α π α
ν α π π μ = −
⎡ ⎤− − + − −⎣ ⎦
− −
− − − − − − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
Π
 
The first term ( )ZZ C ν−  is the profit, gross of loan K, in the absence of an accident. If an 
accident occurs, then the financier will incur the full cost of its liability share, namely 
(1 )Lα− , in two situations: first, if it does not sue the firm and second, if the firm is 
found not guilty by the court (second term: ˆ( ) (1 ) (1 ( , )) (1 )p q P q s Lν ν α⎡ ⎤− − + − −⎣ ⎦ ); if the 
financier sues the firm and the firm is found guilty, then the financier can recover its full 
share of the damages when the firm has realized the high level of profit, in which case the 
financier’s cost is zero (third term: ˆ( ) ( , )(1 )[0]p q P q sν μ− − , as we assume for simplicity 
that if profit is high, that is, if the project is ex-post very valuable, the firm can pay the 
full amount of damages; finally, if the financier sues the firm and the firm is found guilty, 
then it may be able to recover part of its (strict liability) payments if the firm has realized 
the low level of profit, in which case either the firm can pay part of the financier’s costs 
or not, depending on whether 1 ( ) FL ZZ Q q Cπ α− − − −  is positive or not, hence the 
fourth term: { }1ˆ( ) ( , ) (1 ) max 0, ( ) Fp q P q s L L ZZ Q q Cν μ α π α− − − − − − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . 
The total expected profit of the firm FEΠ  can be written as follows, where 
21 )1( πμμππ −+=E : 
( )
{ }
{ }
1 2
1
1
, , , ; , , , , ( )
             ( )(1 ) (1 ) min , ( )
ˆ                       ( ) (1 ( , )) (1 )( ) min , ( )
                                   
F
F F F
E q s K r E Q q ZZ
p q L L Q q ZZ
p q P q s L C L C Q q C ZZ
ν α π π μ π
ν μ α μ α π
ν μ α μ α π
Π = − −
− − − + − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
− − − + + + − − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
{ }1ˆ  ( ) ( , ) (1 )( ) max 0, ( )F Fp q P q s L C Q q C ZZν μ μ π− − + + − − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
In light of our interpretation of the different terms of the expected profit of the financier, 
each term of the above expression is self explanatory. 
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The second stage: At this stage, the values of values of α and s have been determined and the 
firm and the financier choose their respective decisions. The firm chooses q satisfying  
0=∂
Π∂
q
E F  
giving rise to the best reply function 1 2( | , ; , , , , , , , , )F Bq s K r L C Cν α γ π π μ  to the choice of 
ν made by the financier, given α and s set by the government. Knowing this best reply 
function of the firm, the financier chooses ν satisfying  
0BdE
dν
Π =  
taking full account of the best reply function of the firm. The solution to these two 
conditions gives us the second stage equilibrium values, which can be expressed as 
functions of the government-determined variables α and s, namely: 
( )* 1 2, ; , , , , , , , ,F Bs K r L C Cν α γ π π μ  
( )* 1 2, ; , , , , , , , ,F Bq s K r L C Cα γ π π μ . 
The first stage 
We consider, again to simplify the presentation but without loss of generality, that the 
determination of the liability sharing formula involves a “political economy” cost A(α) if 
the government wants to implement a formula away from the most acceptable formula 
from a social or political standpoint (assumed below to correspond to an equal liability 
sharing: α=50 %).22     
The social welfare function SWF(α, s) is given by the following, where W is the social 
value of the firm’s project or activities and λ is the social cost of public funds 
representing the cost of government financing either through taxation or public debt: 
                                                 
22 This assumption will make the interpretation of the chosen α easier by determining a reference point 
α=50%. It plays no other role. 
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( )
* * *
* * *
1
* * * *
1
( , ) [ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]
             ( )(1 ) max{0, ( ( ))}
ˆ                           ( ) 1 ( , ) max{0, ( ( ))}
                                        
F
SWF s W p q L Q q C A
p q L ZZ Q q
p q P q s L ZZ C Q q
α ν α
λ ν μ α π
λ ν μ α π
= − − − −
− − − − −
− − − − − −
− * * * *1ˆ( ) ( , ) max{0, max{0, ( )}}Fp q P q s L ZZ C Q qλ ν μ α π− − − −
The first term of the SWF function, * * *[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]W p q L Q q C Aν α− − − − , is simply the 
net value of the firm/project absent an accident: the social value W minus the expected 
cost of an accident, the cost of care, the cost of maintaining the legal suing capacity, and 
the political economy cost of moving away from the most acceptable liability sharing 
formula.  
The second term, namely * * *1( )(1 ) max{0, ( ( ))}p q L ZZ Q qλ ν μ α π− − − − − , represents in 
expected terms the social cost of payments by the government if an accident occurs and 
the financier is not suing the firm. The firm may be unable to pay its own share of the 
damages, in which case the government must one way or another pay for the remaining 
damages, clean-up costs or compensation costs.  
The third term, namely ( )* * * *1ˆ( ) 1 ( , ) max{0, ( ( ))}Fp q P q s L ZZ C Q qλ ν μ α π− − − − − − , 
represents in expected terms the social cost of payments by the government if an accident 
occurs, the financier is suing the firm (the firm then suffers a legal defence cost FC ), and 
the firm is found not guilty. The firm may again be unable to pay its share of the damages 
of the accident.  
Finally, the fourth term, * * * *1ˆ( ) ( , ) max{0, max{0, ( )}}Fp q P q s L ZZ C Q qλ ν μ α π− − − − − , 
represents in expected terms the social cost of disbursements by the government if an 
accident occurs, the financier is suing the firm, and the firm is found guilty of negligence. 
The firm may once again be unable to pay the full damages of the accident. To 
understand the form of this last term, one must realize that the government will be a 
payer only if the firm cannot even repay its own share of the damages, in which case the 
firm cannot reimburse the financier and the government will pay the residual value 
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*
1{ ( )}FL ZZ C Q qα π− − − − . However, if the firm can reimburse a part of the financier’s 
cost when found guilty of negligence, that is *1max{0, ( )} 0FL ZZ C Q qα π− − − − < , then 
the government would pay nothing under the rule of strict liability of the firm and the 
financier.  
The government maximizes this SWF function with respect to α and s, considering the 
social cost of public funds and the effect of its decision on the choice of ν and q in the 
second stage and the resulting probability of accident, expected damages, the court 
efficiency in avoiding errors, and the total costs of realizing the project, that is, of 
allowing the firm to operate. 
Clearly, the general solution of such a program and the full characterization of the three-
stage equilibrium is a formidable task. Rather than deriving such a general 
characterization, which at best will be seriously restricted by a set of conditional 
statements, we will consider a simplified example, which represents or includes the 
relevant characteristics of the problem at hand.   
5. A SIMPLIFIED EXAMPLE 
We consider the following functions that satisfy the general characteristics of the 
functions we introduced above.  
( ) ( )( ) 00 0 if 01 if  becomes very large0qM M
p q
p q p p p e
p q
η− = =≡ + − − →
⎧⎨ >⎩       (1) 
( )
( )
2 ( / )ˆ , ( 1)
1, if 0
ˆ                          , if  ( , ) 0.5 if ln 2  
0, as  becomes very large
q sP q s q sq e
q
e q s P s s
q
δ
δ
γ γ
δ
−
−
≡ − + +
= =
= = = =
→
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
                     (2) 
where 2( 1)q sqγ γ− + +  equals 1 if either 0γ =  or q s= , is increasing with γ if q s< , and 
is decreasing with γ if q s> . Hence as γ increases, the probability of finding the firm 
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guilty increases if q s< , hence a reduction in Type II errors, and decreases if q s> , 
hence a reduction in Type I errors. 
bzqqQ ≡)( , where 1>b  and z is a positive parameter.       (3) 
( ) nC Bν ν≡                                                                         (4) 
( ) ( 0.5)aA Aα α≡ −                                                               (5) 
We consider the following base case parameter values: π1 = 1000, π2 = 5000, μ = 0.2,  
K = 75, r = 0.10, p0 = 0.4, 0.05Mp = , ln(2)δ = , z = 10, b = 1.2, L = 4000, η = 0.2,  
CF = 0, B = 1, n = 2, λ = 0.3, A = 25, a = 2, and 0=γ .  
Given those values, we obtain the following first-best solution:23  
0.5,  13.17,  ( ) 0.075FB FB FBq s p qα = = = = ; 
and the following asymmetric information solution, which is our base case scenario, from 
which sensitivity analysis will be performed in the next section. 
Base Case 
 Table 1: Base case scenario 
α s υ q p(q) Pˆ (q, s) 
0.37 17.336 0.895 11.902 0.082 0.621 
 
Hence, in this equilibrium with asymmetric information, we have FBα α< , that is, the 
liability share of the firm is lower than in the first-best (complete, although imperfect 
                                                 
23 All numerical results in this section were obtained through MATLAB programming.  We are grateful to 
Peuo Tuon of CIRANO for her assistance in this matter.  
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information) solution. Moreover, FBq q s< =  and ( ) ( )FBp q p q> , that is, the firm exerts 
less care in preventing accident and therefore the probability of accident is larger than 
under first-best conditions.  
6.  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS  
We consider in this section the impact on the first-best and second-best liability sharing 
α, standard of care s, probability of suing υ, exerted care level q, probability of accident 
p(q), and probability of conviction if sued ( )ˆ ,P q s , of changes in the profitability of the 
firm’s project or activities (μ ), the cost ( z ) of care activities, the efficiency (η ) of care 
in reducing the probability of accident, the cost of suing ( B ), the social cost of public 
funds (λ ), and the court efficiency (γ ) in avoiding errors. In the following tables, the 
bold line corresponds to the Base Case scenario of Table 1.  
Case 2: Sensitivity to changes in the profitability of the firm  
The parameters are same as in the above Base Case 1 except for the parameter 
representing the profitability of the firm, namely [0.1,  0.3]μ ∈ ; as μ  increases, that is, as 
the probability of a low level of profit increases, the profitability of the firm’s project or 
activities decreases. We obtain the following:  
Table 2: variable μ  (profitability) 
μ α s υ q p(q) Pˆ (q, s) 
0.10 0.648 7.816 0.819 12.104 0.081 0.342 
0.15 0.494 12.747 0.876 12.043 0.081 0.520 
0.20 0.374 17.336 0.895 11.902 0.082 0.621 
0.25 0.256 22.841 0.906 11.721 0.084 0.701 
0.30 0.183 26.872 0.910 11.495 0.085 0.743 
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Hence, a reduction in the profitability of the firm (higher μ) generates a reduced liability 
for the firm and an increased standard of care; an increase in the probability of suing; a 
reduction in the level of care and a rise in the probability of accident; and a rise in the 
probability of conviction. The main factor explaining those results is that a lower 
profitability of the firm implies a more frequent reliance on government funds to cover 
the cost of an accident. Hence, to alleviate the effect of the social cost of public funds on 
the value of SWF, the financier is made increasingly liable, that is, the legal compulsory 
level of insurance for environmental disasters is increased. Although the level of suing 
increases, the firm tends to lower its care activities given its reduced liability. The 
increases in s combined with the reduction in q increases the probability of conviction.  
Case 3: Sensitivity to changes in the cost of care  
The parameters are same as in Base Case 1 except for the parameter representing the cost 
of care activities, namely [5,  20]z∈ . We obtain the following, where the first-best 
solution changes with the changes in parameter z:  
Table 3: variable z (cost of care) 
, ,    [   ]FB FB FBz q pα  α s υ q p(q) Pˆ (q, s) 
5.00 [0.5, 16.417,  0.063] 0.403 12.791 0.882 15.038 0.067 0.443 
7.50 [0.5, 14.513,  0.069] 0.391 15.438 0.890 13.202 0.075 0.553 
10.0 [0.5, 13.171,  0.075] 0.374 17.336 0.895 11.902 0.082 0.621 
12.5 [0.5, 12.137,  0.081] 0.346 19.141 0.900 10.906 0.090 0.674 
15.0 [0.5, 11.298,  0.087] 0.320 20.045 0.903 10.089 0.097 0.705 
17.5 [0.5, 10.591,  0.092] 0.302 19.547 0.903 9.392 0.103 0.717 
20.0 [0.5,   9.983,  0.098] 0.267 19.865 0.906 8.803 0.110 0.736 
 
Hence, a higher cost of care changes the first-best values (a reduced care q and therefore 
an increased probability of accident p(q)) and generates: a reduced liability for the firm 
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but the standard of care goes up and down; an increase in the probability of suing; a 
reduction in the level of care; a rise in the probability of accident and in the probability of 
conviction. The fact that the first-best level of care is reduced implies that the 
government wants to set a lower liability share for the firm inducing a lower level of care 
and therefore a higher probability of accident.  
Case 4: Sensitivity to changes in the efficiency of care  
The parameters are the same as in Base Case 1 except for the parameter representing the 
efficiency of care in reducing the probability of accident, namely [0.1,  0.3]η ∈ . We 
obtain the following, where the first-best solution changes with the changes in parameter 
η : 
Table 4: variable η  (efficiency of care) 
, ,    [   ]FB FB FBq pη α  α s υ q p(q) Pˆ (q, s) 
0.10 [0.50, 18.709, 0.104] 0.318 44.440 0.938 16.697 0.116 0.771 
0.15 [0.50, 15.433, 0.085] 0.366 27.524 0.917 13.918 0.093 0.704 
0.20 [0.50, 13.171, 0.075] 0.374 17.336 0.895 11.902 0.082 0.621 
0.25 [0.50, 11.536, 0.070] 0.362 12.448 0.874 10.428 0.076 0.560 
0.30 [0.50, 10.297, 0.066] 0.358 9.206 0.849 9.286 0.072 0.497 
 
Hence, an increased efficiency of care in reducing the probability of an accident changes 
the first-best values (reduced care level q and a reduced probability of accident p(q)) and 
generates: a liability for the firm that goes up and down but a decreased standard of care; 
a reduction in the probability of suing; a reduction in the level of care but a reduction in 
the probability of accident; and a reduction in the probability of conviction. When care is 
more efficient, the government wants to save on costly care activities while achieving a 
lower probability of accident. To do so, it basically maintains the liability share of the 
firm but reduces the standard of care; this lowers the value of suing for the financier. 
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Although realized care level and probability of accident move in the same directions as 
their first best values, the probability of conviction goes down as the reduction in realized 
care is less pronounced than the reduction in the standard of care. 
Case 5: Sensitivity to changes in the cost of suing (efficiency of monitoring)  
The parameters are the same as in Base Case 1 except for the parameter representing the 
cost for the financier of suing, that is, the cost of maintaining the necessary internal legal 
competencies, namely [0.5,  2.5]B∈ . We obtain the following:  
Table 5: variable B (cost of suing) 
B α s υ q p(q) Pˆ (q, s) 
0.50 0.303 24.167 0.935 12.078 0.081 0.707 
1.00 0.374 17.336 0.895 11.902 0.082 0.621 
1.50 0.432 14.016 0.856 11.765 0.083 0.559 
2.00 0.492 11.554 0.812 11.645 0.084 0.497 
2.50 0.564 9.314 0.751 11.535 0.085 0.424 
 
Hence, an increase in the cost of suing generates: an increased liability for the firm and 
decreased standard of care; a reduction in probability of suing; a reduction in the level of 
care; an increase in the probability of accident; and, a reduction in the probability of 
conviction. Clearly, the capacity or efficiency of the financier in inducing proper 
behavior by the firm is reduced when the cost of suing increases. Hence, the government 
will want to impose a higher liability share on the firm. To avoid a too important increase 
in care activities, it lowers significantly the standard of care leading to a net decrease in 
the level of care. But again, the reduction in realized care is less pronounced than the 
reduction in the standard of care and therefore the probability of conviction is lowered. 
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Case 6: Sensitivity to changes in the social cost of public funds 
The parameters are same as in Base Case 1 except for the parameter representing the 
social cost of public funds, namely [0.1,  0.5]λ ∈ . We obtain the following:  
Table 6: variable λ  (social cost of public funds) 
λ α s υ q p(q) Pˆ (q, s) 
0.1 0.768 7.698 0.761 11.907 0.082 0.342 
0.2 0.533 14.157 0.871 11.921 0.082 0.558 
0.3 0.374 17.336 0.895 11.902 0.082 0.621 
0.4 0.220 20.056 0.909 11.883 0.083 0.663 
0.5 0.181 20.769 0.912 11.879 0.083 0.673 
 
Hence, an increase in the social cost of public funds (reduced efficiency of government 
financing) generates: a reduced liability for the firm and increased standard of care; an 
increase in probability of suing; an early increase and later reduction in care; an early 
reduction and later increase in probability of accident, the precise values being 0.082345, 
0.082258, 0.082377 (the base case value), 0.082503, and 0.082528; and, an increase in 
the probability of conviction. Those impacts are basically due to the need for the 
government to reduce its own disbursements given their higher social costs. To achieve 
that, it lowers the liability share of the firm thereby making the compulsory insurance 
level higher. To avoid a too important reduction in care, the government increases also 
the standard of care. This induces the financier to sue more often because of the higher 
probability of conviction.   
Case 7: Sensitivity to changes in the efficiency of the court system 
The parameters are the same as in Base Case 1 except for the parameter representing the 
efficiency of the court system to avoid errors of Type I and II, namely [ ]009.0,0∈γ . We 
obtain the following:  
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Table 7: variable γ  (efficiency of the court system) 
γ α s υ q p(q) Pˆ (q, s) 
0.000 0.374 17.336 0.894 11.900 0.082 0,621 
0.001 0.400 15.0580 0.889 12.108 0.081 0,593 
0.002 0.341 14.2430 0.892 12.314 0.080 0,575 
0.003 0.304 13.2460 0.891 12.480 0.079 0,535 
0.004 0.281 12.3610 0.888 12.602 0.078 0,487 
0.005 0.265 11.6440 0.883 12.693 0.078 0,438 
0.006 0.249 11.1070 0.877 12.775 0.077 0,393 
0.007 0.235 10.6730 0.871 12.842 0.077 0,350 
0.008 0.223 10.3310 0.864 12.903 0.077 0,309 
0.009 0.211 10.0630 0.856 12.961 0.076 0,271 
 
As parameter γ increases, the efficiency of the court system in avoiding errors of Type I 
and II increases as increases in γ increases the probability of conviction Pˆ (q, s) if q s< , 
that is, when insufficient care is exerted by the firm, and reduces that probability if q s> , 
that is, when more than sufficient care is exerted. Hence, an increase in the efficiency of 
the court system generates: a reduced liability for the firm (for 0.001γ ≥ ) and a reduced 
standard of care; a decrease in probability of suing (for 0.002γ ≥ ); an increase in the 
level of care exerted by the firm, from below the standard level chosen by the 
government to above that value for 0.004γ ≥ ; a corresponding reduction in the 
probability of accident;24 and, a reduction in the probability of conviction, which blends 
different factors, namely the higher efficiency of the court system, the reduction in the 
standard of care, and the increase in the level of care exerted. 
                                                 
24 The probability decreases steadily even if some values in Table 7 are the same due to rounding values.  
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From the results reported in Table 7, we can say that the efficiency of the court system to 
avoid errors of both Type I and Type II improves the efficiency of liability sharing as an 
environmental policy instrument: an increase in γ generates a decrease in the probability 
of accident p(q)) resulting from the new liability sharing factor and the new decisions by 
financiers and firms.  
Two observations of the impact of an increase in the efficiency of the court system 
deserve some comments. First, as γ increases, firms tend to exert an “excessive” level of 
care q as compared to the due care level s chosen by the government. Second, this 
increase in γ allows the government to reduce the liability share of firms at the expense of 
a larger liability share of financiers.  
Regarding the first effect, it suggests that the increased efficiency of the court system 
generates stronger incentives for firms to exert more care, eventually surpassing the due 
care level.25 Moreover, this increased efficiency of the court system means that firms, 
which may also suffer from the fact that their chosen care level is difficult to observe, 
would indeed increase their level of care if it can be recognized with more accuracy by 
the courts if and when an accident occurs and the firm is sued by its financial partner. We 
observe in reality many forms of self regulation (like cases of green certification) that 
show an effort by the firms to exert care that goes beyond the legal standard. Such self 
regulation may also serve to convey to financiers better assurance that a given firm will 
exert a higher level of care, once the government increases the share of liability falling on 
financiers increases as the efficiency of the court system increases.   
Regarding the second effect, it implies that the increased efficiency of the court allows 
the government to increase the liability share of financiers. Two reasons justify this 
policy choice: first, if the firms behave negligently there will be a credible way for 
financiers to partly recover their share of the costs of an environmental accident and 
second, the government, given the social cost of public funds, wants to avoid costly 
disbursements by transferring liability from firms to financiers. 
                                                 
25 See the discussion of Kaplow (1994) and the others in Section 3 above. 
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From an environmental protection viewpoint, the legislator can transfer more liability to 
financiers if it can provide a more efficient justice system, thereby protecting financiers 
against the negligent behavior of firms: investing in the justice system to increase the 
efficiency of courts to avoid errors generates benefits for the government both in terms of 
reductions in accident probabilities and in terms of public money disbursements given 
that the strict liability of financiers for environmental accidents can be increased.    
7. CONCLUSION 
The different impacts of a more efficient court system on liability sharing and 
environmental protection are due to intricate interactions between the different factors 
shaping the incentives faced by firms in their safety care strategies as well as the social 
welfare maximizing objective of the government. When facing a more efficient court 
system, which contributes to raising the incentives of firms to exert more care, the 
government chooses to enact legislation providing a lower legal liability share for the 
firms as well as a lower standard level of care, expecting that firms and financiers will 
exploit such legal provisions to reduce the probability of suing and to increase the level 
of care, resulting in the end in a reduced probability of accident. Hence, a more efficient 
court system allows the stakeholders to face better incentives allowing for a reduction in 
the probability of suing and a reduction of the likelihood of costly government 
disbursements due to a lower liability share for firms, a reduced probability of accident, 
as well as a reduced overall probability of conviction if an accident case is litigated in 
courts.   
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